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 Abstract 
As J. P. Spencer et al. (2009) argue, the theories of some developmental psychologists 
continue to be nativistic, even though nativism is an inherently nondevelopmental school 
of thought. Psychologists interested in development study the emergence of human 
characteristics—including predispositions—and are not content to simply catalogue 
competences that characterize human newborns; instead, they recognize that all human 
characteristics, including those present at birth, reflect the circumstances of development. 
A truly developmental science of behavior requires rejecting the nativism–empiricism 
debate outright, abandoning ideas such as ‘‘core knowledge’’ and psychological 
‘‘endowments,’’ and adopting a process perspective that focuses on how  traits emerge 
from the co-actions of biological and experiential factors. Unlike nativism, the process 
perspective advocated by J. P. Spencer et al. encourages research that can reveal the 
developmental origins of psychological characteristics of interest. 
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In “Short arms and talking eggs: Why we should no longer abide the nativist-
empiricist debate,” Spencer et al. (2009) criticize several constructs—e.g., “endowments, 
primitives, core knowledge, essences”—that some psychologists employ in spite of 
advances in developmental science suggesting they are not helpful. In particular, they 
criticize Spelke & Kinzler (2007), who appear to seek middle ground in the empiricist-
nativist debate by arguing that the human mind is neither “a single general-purpose 
learning system” nor made of “myriad special-purpose systems and predispositions,” but 
rather is composed of “a small number of separable systems of core knowledge” (p. 89). 
Although Spencer et al. frame their discussion as a reaction, in part, to Spelke & 
Kinzler’s nativism, it is worth noting that Spelke & Kinzler do not explicitly use some of 
the concepts that Spencer et al. find problematic. For example, Spencer et al. criticize the 
nativist notion of “relevant experience,” but Spelke & Kinzler never use this concept 
explicitly (and they use it implicitly only once, when discussing Valenza et al., 2006). 
Likewise, Spelke & Kinzler do not explicitly label any behaviors “innate,” even though 
nativists typically refer to at least some behaviors in this way. Nevertheless, Spencer et 
al. have not created a straw man; the nativist conceptions that concern them characterize 
the works of many psychologists, Spelke & Kinzler included. For example, despite 
Spelke & Kinzler’s rejection of “single general-purpose” and “myriad special-purpose” 
views of the mind, their claim that people are “endowed” with “separable systems of core 
knowledge” clearly bears a close resemblance to the modern-nativist tenets that human 
minds have been shaped by evolution (“endowed”) and are modular (“separable 
systems”). 
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Spelke & Kinzler reject evolutionary psychologists’ theories of massive 
modularity, but their nativism is nonetheless evident in their notion of “core knowledge.” 
It appears they consider knowledge systems to be “core” if they have phylogenetic roots 
and can be detected in infants. Thus, they believe there is something special about 
characteristics present in infancy; in fact, in an early paper on “core knowledge,” Spelke 
(2000) wrote that cognitive systems that are “building blocks” for complex cognitive 
skills “may be especially amenable to study in infants, where they appear in relatively 
pure form” (p. 1241). However, the systems perspective increasingly favored by 
developmentalists (Gottlieb, 2007; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003; Oyama, Griffiths, & 
Gray, 2001) holds that traits that characterize infants are no more “pure” than other traits, 
because all traits emerge from developmental processes. In contrast, the idea that traits 
present in infancy provide privileged insight into “human nature” is quintessentially 
nativistic. 
Nativists typically assume neonatal characteristics are “pure” because newborns 
have not had certain experiences1 (e.g., exposure to patterned light). However, a 
discovery indicating that a competence develops even without particular experiential 
input cannot support positive claims about the competence’s origins. As Lehrman (1953) 
realized a half-century ago, we cannot infer that a competence is “innate” just because it 
develops in the absence of particular experiences; at best, such findings illuminate which 
                                                
1Surprisingly, Spelke & Kinzler (2007) argue that 3-month-olds’ “visual preference for members of their 
own race” (p. 92) reflects the operation of a “core knowledge system,” even though this bias requires 
specific experiences to develop. Consequently, it is not clear why the early appearance of such a bias 
renders it “core”; other psychological traits—the ability to read, for example—emerge after exposure later 
in life to particular stimuli, but no one argues that such traits somehow signal “core” knowledge. 
Furthermore, the idea that racial biases have “evolutionary roots” is unsubstantiated in this paper, other 
than by reference to the speculative musings of some evolutionary psychologists. Without well-defined 
criteria for designating “knowledge systems” as “core,” it is unclear why we should think racial biases are 
any more “core” than biases without phylogenetic roots or early appearances in infancy. 
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experiential factors do not contribute to its development. The question of which 
experiential factors do contribute remains unanswered without further developmental 
analysis. Although intuition suggests that experience with patterned light should 
influence object-boundary perception, for example, we cannot know which experiential 
factors are influential before probing development; as Spencer et al. note, characteristics 
often develop only after organisms have particular experiences not obviously relevant to 
the characteristics’ development. 
If a competence or predisposition is found in infancy, scientists with a genuinely 
developmental orientation ask “from whence did this competence or predisposition 
emerge?” Among the things developmentalists do not conclude from such discoveries are 
a) that the competence or predisposition was pre-specified—in the genome or anywhere 
else—in a way that allowed it to develop independently of the context in which it 
emerged, b) that it is an “endowment” indicative of a particular phylogenetic history, or 
c) that it has some privileged “core” status relative to later-developing abilities (the 
ability to read, for example) that other skills or beliefs can be built on. Developmentalists 
refrain from the latter conclusions because they are mere speculations. They refrain from 
the first conclusion because human characteristics never emerge independently of 
developmental circumstances. Among the most important discoveries of modern 
developmental science has been the finding that genes are expressed in epigenetic 
contexts that profoundly influence development (Harper, 2005; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005; 
Weaver et al., 2007) and that species-typical brain structures, likewise, often reflect the 
contexts—both pre- and post-natal—in which development occurs (Johnson, 2005). 
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Developmentally-oriented scientists are interested not in the number or nature of 
human predispositions, but in their origins, because like all characteristics, 
predispositions must develop; they cannot be genetically specified or emerge 
independently of development (Moore, 2001). Even cross-cultural or cross-species 
universals like Spelke & Kinzler’s “endowments” develop, via processes that are 
dynamic and interactive (Thelen & Smith, 1994). This insight spurs researchers to probe 
the process by which predispositions (or competences or any other traits) develop. Thus, 
process approaches are pragmatic; they encourage research on a predisposition’s origins, 
which could reveal how to influence its development. In contrast, claims that infants are 
born with a predisposition seem to answer a question about origins, but they actually do 
not.  Identifying early-appearing proclivities and labeling them “core”—a designation 
implying they are somehow ‘atomic’ and not subject to further analysis—effectively 
short-circuits developmental investigation, halting the scientific pursuit of understanding 
(Lehrman, 1953). The value of a process approach was obvious to embryologist Wilhelm 
His 120 years ago, when he wrote: 
“...The single word ‘heredity’ cannot dispense science from the duty of 
making every possible inquiry into the mechanism of organic growth…To 
think that heredity will build organic beings without mechanical means is a 
piece of unscientific mysticism...A direct explanation…[of trait emergence] 
can only come from the immediate study of the different phases of individual 
development…” (His, 1888, p. 295). 
The same could be written of the words “endowed” or “core.” 
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Thus, the real insight of developmental science has been the realization that the 
empiricist-nativist debate cannot be resolved by agreeing that the truth lies somewhere 
between poles staked out by empiricists and nativists; instead, developmental research 
indicates that the debate itself should be rejected outright, as a conversation generated in 
response to a poorly formed question, namely, whether human nature is learned or 
inherited.  Focusing on developmental origins reveals that traits develop from complex 
interactions involving the participation of factors—including both genetic and non-
genetic factors operating at all levels of organization—that cannot be understood in terms 
of older conceptions of inheritance or learning.  Developmental systems theorists have 
discovered that experiences often influence development in ways that bear little 
resemblance to well-characterized modes of learning, and that organisms “inherit” from 
their ancestors both biological and non-biological contributors to development (Oyama et 
al., 2001). Consequently, Spencer et al.’s (2009) concerns about claims that appear to 
resolve the empiricist-nativist debate are justifiable. 
Spencer et al. effectively critique nativism, but they do not embrace empiricism; 
they never argue that evolutionary accounts are valueless in attempts to explain human 
cognition or that “a single learning system” can explain all psychological phenomena. 
Instead, they reject the empiricism-nativism debate entirely. But unlike Spelke & Kinzler, 
who claim to seek resolution while still promulgating nativism, Spencer et al. reject the 
debate by suggesting we stop asking whether or not experiences contribute to 
development, and ask instead how traits emerge from the co-actions of the biological and 
experiential factors that together comprise the complex developmental systems we are. 
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